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Abstract 
The functionalities, redundancy and possible failure 
scenarios of the cryogenic system will be briefly 
presented based on components reliability and impact on 
beam commissioning. Requirements and problems related 
to accessibility and radiation issues for in-situ repair or 
exchange will be addressed. A list of possible 
interventions for repairs will be given together with the 
associated downtime for beam commissioning. Finally, 
the strategy for spares and maintenance policy (corrective 
against preventive) and the consequences on the system 
availability will be presented with the consequent 
shutdown scenarios. 
INTRODUCTION 
Large scale cryogenic systems have been already used 
at CERN for previous accelerators (SPS, LEP). Most of 
the primary cryogenic components of such systems 
(screw compressors, turbines, instrumentation, etc…) 
have been extensively used and a wide operational 
experience is available at CERN. Since 2001, additional 
operation experience on LHC cryogenic systems (first 18 
kW @ 4.5 K refrigerator at PM18 and String 2 test 
campaign) has been cumulated. Based on this experience 
and the LHC cryogenic system architecture, reliability of 
components and sub-systems has been analysed focused 
on possible failures and availability affecting beam 
commissioning. Indicators such as mean time between 
failure (MTBF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) are 
given when possible. 
Reliability being strongly related to maintenance 
policy, maintenance and shutdown scenarios are also 
presented as they will certainly have an influence on the 
availability of the cryogenic system.  
LEP2 EXPERIENCE 
A simplified layout of the LHC cryogenic system 
compared to the LEP2 one is shown in Figure 1. With 
more than 30.000 running hours, the LEP2 cryogenic 
system was very reliable with less than 1% downtime for 
the LEP machine due to cryogenics [1]. Figure 2 shows 
the cryogenic downtime rates for the LEP machine from 
























4 x 12/18 kW @ 4.5 K
288 SC RF cavities
2 km @ 4.5 K
8 x 18 kW @ 4.5 K
8 x 2,4 kW @ 1.9 K
1’800 SC magnets
24 km @ 1.9 K
36‘000 tons @ 1.9 K
LEP2
75 tons @ 4.5 K
 
Figure 2: LEP2 and LHC simplified layouts 
 
Main components failures appeared during 
commissioning or just after winter shutdown maintenance 
campaign (“post shutdown” effect). Predominant failures 
came from compressor stations (MTBF 0.1 year) due to 
aging of instrumentation or piping (high vibration levels). 
Cold boxes proved to be very reliable (MTBF ~years), in 
particular instrumentation and turbines. In any case, most 
of the corrective maintenance interventions were very 
efficient (average MTTR ~ 2-3 hours), mainly due to well 
trained operation teams and availability of spares.   
Main issues concerning cryogenic distribution and 
cryomodules were beam related (heat load) and didn’t 
affect the availability of the cryogenic system but locally 
limited the cooling capacity [2, 3].  
Gaseous impurity problems at warm turbines level (120 
K and 90 K) were also an important issue [1, 3]. Although 
there was no direct downtime, interventions were 
regularly scheduled in order to recover the cooling 
capacity. This time was used for other machine 
interventions.  


































Figure 2: cryogenic downtime impact on LEP machine 
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THE LHC CRYOGENIC SYSTEM 
The layout of the LHC cryogenic system (figure 2) 
already detailed in other specialised papers [4, 5] is based 
on eight cryoplants, each one composed of a 4.5 K 
refrigerator coupled to a 1.8 K refrigerator. As shown in 
figure 3, these cryoplants are grouped by two in LHC 
points 4, 6 and 8 where the interconnecting box (QUI) 
assures distribution to the two adjacent sectors through 
the respective cryogenic distribution line (QRL). This 
symmetry is not respected for the other two cryoplants, 
which have been installed separately in points 2 and 1.8.  
The interconnecting boxes allow interconnection 
between cryoplants to assure distribution of the cooling 
capacity to the two adjacent sectors. This is not true for 
sector 2-3, where the cooling capacity can only be 
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Figure 3: The cryogenic system architecture per point. 
MAJOR AND COMPONENTS FAILURES 
Major Failures (sub-systems) 
We consider that a complete failure of a cryogenic sub-
system (refrigerator, QUI, QRL, etc.) is possible but very 
unlikely to occur. The most probable failure would be the 
loss of insulation vacuum.  
If one 4.5 K or 1.8 K refrigerator is stopped or not 
operational, the QUI allows to use the adjacent cryoplant 
to distribute sufficient cooling capacity to the two sectors 
for low intensity run. However, the estimated transition 
period to re-establish the flow and nominal conditions for 
beam would be more than 12 hours. As mentioned before, 
this option is not possible for sector 2-3. 
Major failures of any of the other main sub-systems, 
QUI, QRL and electrical feed box (DFB), will lead to the 
total stop of the machine as no redundancy is available.  
The following points summarize the failure analysis for 
the components of the different cryogenic sub-systems.  
4.5 K and 1.8 K Refrigerators 
There is no redundancy (or spares) for warm 
compressors (motor/compressor) but the spare capacity 
and/or connection to adjacent refrigerators would allow 
degraded mode (low intensity). Most likely failures to 
occur are breaking of compressor’s instrumentation 
(MTTR ~ 1-2 hours) or oil injection piping (MTTR ~ 1-2 
days) due to vibrations. 
Cold boxes instrumentation has proved to be very 
reliable and available spares would assure fast 
replacement (MTTR ~ 1-2 hours). For cold compressors 
(1.8 K refrigerators) spares are available as no degraded 
mode is allowed. Spares for turbines are not foreseen (1.8 
K and 4.5 K refrigerators) as degraded modes allow 
continuation of tests. In any case, diagnosis and 5 hours 
intervention will be needed for replacement (in case of 
available spares). 
The installation of dryers (H2O removal) before the 
cold boxes and switchable adsorbers at 80 K (air removal) 
will prevent gaseous impurity problems. In case of 
insulation vacuum leaks, temporary solutions will allow 
running until winter shutdown when major interventions 
could be done. 
In case of intervention in the cold boxes, access will be 
needed for underground areas. Special access to UX1.8, 
UX4, UX6 and UX8 will be needed for four 1.8 K cold 
boxes. 
From the cooling capacity point of view component 
failures should not affect beam commissioning (spares, 
redundancy and connection to adjacent refrigerator) but 
the operational constraints and the recovery time will 
increase. Degraded modes might be a limitation for 
scrubbing run. 
Interconnecting Box (QUI) 
Redundancy will be available for control loop and QRL 
interfaces instrumentation. Cryogenic valves are not 
redundant as they are considered as highly reliable 
(MTBF ~ years). The main issue concerning availability 
of the QUI will be the clogging of line D filter (on each 
sector) by solid impurities. This would mainly happen 
during cool down and first quenches provoking a stop of 
the cooling flow. Intervention will require 1-2 days to 
replace the filter and reach nominal conditions. 
Alternative solutions to increase reliability and reduce the 
MTTR are under study  
In case of insulation vacuum leaks, temporary solutions 
will allow running until winter shutdown when major 
interventions could be done. 
Any intervention will need underground access to the 
UX and US for point 2. 
From the functionality point of view, the QUI assures 
the redundancy of the cryoplants to supply the cooling 
capacity to two adjacent sectors (except for sector 2-3). 
QRL and Ring components 
Insulation vacuum issues for QRL and ring components 
are described in [6]. 
 
• QRL: instrumentation is redundant or allows degraded 
modes. Most of the cryogenic valves are redundant 
allowing degrade modes (higher helium flows and less 
control). In case of in situ exchange, 1 week 
intervention will be needed depending on the valve 
position. Quench valves filling functionality is not 
redundant (typically once/year operation), but the 
safety functionality is fully redundant. 
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• Beam screen: clogging of circuits (very small diameter 
pipe) might be an issue, provoking perturbations on the 
cooling flow and loss of beam screen temperature 
control. Failure of electrical heater and temperature 
sensors (no redundancy) will result in degraded mode 
(no temperature control and higher helium flow) but 
could be a limitation for scrubbing run. 
• Current Feed Boxes (DFB), superconducting links 
(DSL) and Standalone magnets: level gauges are 
redundant and easily to repair (except for some D2’s 
and D3’s). Concerning current leads, temperature 
control valves are easy to replace and temperature 
sensors are redundant or can be replaced by other 
control options (valve characteristics). More detailed 
analysis on the DFB and its components is available in 
[7].  
• Dipoles and Inner Triplets: magnet temperature sensors 
are redundant (only electronics replacement needed). 
Other control options such as opening valve 
characteristics or copying valve position of adjacent 
cells (only for dipoles) will be also possible. Failure of 
the bayonet heat exchanger level gauge could provoke 
liquid in the pumping line B with the consequent 
magnet temperature perturbation. 
• Radiofrequency cavities: previous considerations about 
instrumentation and cryogenic valves apply. Main 
issues concerning cavities are pressure stability and 
protection during quench [8].  
 
From the functionality point of view, reliability of most 
of the primary components is high. Replacement or 
degraded modes will avoid impact on beam 
commissioning. Any intervention will need access to the 
tunnel. 
Utilities Failures Recovery 
As already described in [9], cryogenics availability is 
highly dependent on utilities (electrical power, cooling 
water, compressed air and controls). Figure 4 shows the 
estimated recovery time for the LHC cryogenic system 
together with results from LEP operation during 1998-
2000 and few points of mains failures during operations 
of the LHC Test String. 
The cryogenic recovery acts as a time amplifier of the 
utility stop, the recovery time being equal to 6 hours plus 
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Figure 4: Mains failure recovery performances. 
Recovery predictions and performances have still to be 
validated for the global cryogenic system during hardware 
commissioning, as only individual sub-systems functional 
tests have been done until now. In any case, degraded 
modes will certainly increase recovery time. 
During commissioning of the first LHC cryogenic sub-
systems, an increasing dependence on controls have been 
noticed. The control system for cryogenics being itself 
under commissioning, the reliability of this system is not 
up to expectations and clearly needs to be improved. 
FIRST LHC EXPERIENCE 
The first LHC 18 kW at 4.5 K refrigerator has been in 
operation for the LHC magnet test bench since 2002. 
With more than 20000 cumulated running hours the 
availability of this refrigerator has been about 99%. Apart 
from the post-commissioning period, the reliability of 
components has confirmed LEP experience, although the 
high performance is partly explained by the possibility of 
running with degraded modes and the spare cooling 
capacity.  
In spite of being a prototype and test facility, String2 
experience (2002-2003) also confirmed the positive 
predictions. The availability was 98.5% for about 6000 
running hours and main downtime was due to tuning, 
quench recovery and controls validations. No major 
problems were detected concerning instrumentation or 
beam screen circuits. 
 
MAINTENANCE AND SHUTDOWN 
STRATEGY 
Maintenance Policy 
The reliability of the cryogenic system is highly 
dependent on maintenance. Maintenance policy is based 
on a complete maintenance plan: equipment lists and their 
criticality, spare parts list, preventive routines and 
corrective follow up actions, historic of interventions and 
performance indicators. This maintenance plan has to be 
upgraded (old LEP installations), completed (new LHC 
installations) and implemented in CERN CAMMS before 
getting the sub-systems into operation [10]. 
The key factors of this maintenance plan are: 
• Preventive maintenance: extensive maintenance 
campaign during winter shutdown (baseline, 13 
weeks) 
• Spare parts: a criticality analysis method is used in 
order to establish a first batch of spare parts just after 
the commissioning (~2.2% of cryoplant cost). This 
allows a fast capacity reaction in case of component 
failure and assures MTTR of few hours. 
 
 However, for some main components such as turbines, 
warm compressors and associated electrical motors there 
will be no spares. 
Executive maintenance resources are completely 
outsourced and no competences are available at CERN. In 
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view of LHC operation, all cryogenic maintenance will 
need to be based on CERN CAMMS and the cryogenic 
maintenance management will need to be reinforced. 
Shutdown Strategy 
Based on a 16 weeks shutdown [11] and a maintenance 
policy as presented, two shutdown scenarios are 
envisaged. 
Scenario1: full stop and maintenance campaign on all 
the cryogenic sub-systems, keeping the magnets at 
floating temperature (~200 K). This option is based on the 
present maintenance philosophy and will assure the same 
availability rates. However, due to the large number of 
installations to be maintained the “post shutdown” effect 
might have a more important impact during start up (cold 
check-out, beam?). Thermal cycling of components will 
increase the risk of helium leaks and materials (welding) 
stress. In addition, magnet temperatures above 80 K will 
require additional 5 weeks during machine cold check-out 
for electrical reconditioning (ELQA). 
Scenario 2: partial maintenance on 1 cryoplant per 
point keeping sectors cold. In this case “post shutdown” 
effect will be reduced although availability rate for the 
non maintained cryoplant will certainly decrease. Thermal 
cycling and additional time for ELQA will be suppressed. 
This scenario is not possible for sector 2-3, although 
cooling capacity at 80 K from point 1.8 cryoplant might 
solve the problem. 
 Utilities availability during shutdown will be driven by 
the cooling water towers maintenance. The present 
baseline is 4 weeks per LHC point (2 points in parallel) so 
a total of 10 weeks. Scenario 2 would require to review 
this baseline. 
In any case, warm up could be needed for ring 
components replacement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In principle, the cryogenic system should have a very 
low impact (except for sector 2-3) on beam 
commissioning because of: 
• Redundancy of systems. 
• Available spare cooling capacity for low intensity 
mode. 
• Reliability of components and instrumentation 
 
However, failure of sub-systems and components 
cannot be ruled out completely and could result in few 
days’ delays to switch to redundant sub-system or 
component and to adapt to the new configuration:  
• Worst failure would be loss of insulation vacuum in the 
QUI or QRL as well as the refrigerator in point 2 or 
DFB’s for magnet powering. 
• Most likely failure would be filters blockage in the QUI 
during or after the first cool down and magnets quench 
due to accumulation of impurities.  
• Recovery time after major failure (cryo or utilities) will 
be approximately 6 hours plus 3 times the stop length 
(15 times in case of bad vacuum or quench valve 
leaks). 
 
The cryogenic sub-systems will be individually tested, 
but the overall cryogenic system will certainly require 
complex and extensive commissioning prior and during 
powering in order to validate the collective behaviour and 
optimize operating modes. The availability or quench 
recovery performances of the LHC cryogenic system:  
• Could be reduced by additional heat loads or non 
conformities from commissioning magnet powering. 
• Strongly depend on a correct and effective maintenance 
management: it has already started and needs CERN 
dedicated resources. 
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